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# The "Warfare State": History of a Concept

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AN ACCUSATION IS ABROAD in the land which, if unfamiliar until recently, is far from as unprecedented as is often supposed. Not surprisingly, perhaps, the assertion that political, military, and industrial interests are conniving to perpetuate crisis is frequently taken today to be a new phenomenon and, like the "complex" it purports to attack, the product of an extraordinary "cold war" situation. Yet charges of this kind, either in whole or in part, have many times been heard before in other contexts, and in words strikingly similar to those in use at present.

This essay is intended to point up the considerable history of such ideas and their developing interrelationships. Thus, the focus is primarily upon the concepts themselves and not upon the forces that shaped them nor upon the objective reality of what observers thought they saw. In pursuing this emphasis, I desire in no way to denigrate the importance or the seriousness of the sociostructural changes which were and are occurring, but simply to assist the further definition of a field in which there has been an astonishing lack of dependable scholarly work.<sup>1</sup> At

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<sup>1</sup> There is, e.g., a real need for study of the recurring peace movement in America and Europe, especially in the latter, where pacifism has become somewhat obscured by its strategic alliance with socialism. The secondary literature includes relatively little beyond the following: Roland Bainton, *Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace* (New York, 1960), Kurt von Raumer, *Ewiger Friede: Friedensrufe und Friedenspläne seit der Renaissance* (Freiburg, 1953), Elizabeth Souleyman, *The Vision of World Peace in 17th and 18th Century France* (New York, 1941), Christina Phelps, *The Anglo American Peace Movement in the Mid-Nineteenth Century* (New York, 1930), Merle Curti, *The American Peace Crusade, 1815-60* (Durham, N.C., 1929), Curti, *Peace or War: The American Struggle, 1636-1936* (Boston, 1936), Peter Brock, *Pacifism in the United States from the Colonial Era to the First World War* (Princeton, 1968), John K. Nelson, *The Peace Prophets: American Pacifist Thought, 1919-1941* (Chapel Hill, 1969), Laurence Wittner, *Rebels Against War: The American Peace Movement, 1941-1960* (New York, 1969), Christopher Driver, *The Disarmers* (London, 1964), David Boulton, *Voices from the Crowd against the H bomb* (London, 1964), and Norman Moss, *Men Who Play God* (New York, 1967). Also relevant and particularly

any rate, it is assumed that, once in existence, ideas or myths can have considerable causal power in their own right, and are therefore worthy in themselves of extensive examination. Moreover, it is hoped that an analysis of what men believed about reality may give us new hints as to what was actually going on outside their minds.

One last point of introduction: Fred J. Cook's term, the "warfare state,"<sup>2</sup> has been employed here to stand in a general sense for contemporary suspicions, not in order to limit ourselves to the definition of the problem he presents, but simply because his phrase encompasses, more easily than any other, the tripartite nature of the coalition which is feared. Nevertheless, any one of several related and current descriptions could have been used, including Marcus Raskin's "national security state," Juan Bosch's "Pentagonism," Murray Weidenbaum's "defense-space complex," or the best known of all, Dwight D. Eisenhower's "military-industrial complex."<sup>3</sup> The only weakness of the last term is its lack of a third adjective to represent the "governmental" factor, which in most statements of the case is so obviously involved.<sup>4</sup>



Distrust of the politician, soldier, and businessman as they relate to war, then, is nothing new. From the beginnings of history, these have

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interesting for their comparative approach are Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, The State and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York, 1959) and Donald A. Wells, *The War Myth* (New York, 1967).

For analysis of the sociostructural changes which were and are taking place, one is largely dependent, beyond those works cited in this essay, upon general diplomatic, military, and economic histories. Yet there are a number of notable volumes, including Eckart Kehr, *Schlachtfloottenbau und Parteipolitik, 1894-1901* (Berlin, 1930), Oron James Hale, *Publicity and Diplomacy with Special Reference to England and Germany, 1890-1914* (Charlottesville, 1940), Gerhard Ritter, *Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk: Das Problem des Militarismus in Deutschland* (4 vols., Munich, 1954-1968), Aaron Wildavsky, *The Politics of the Budgetary Process* (Boston, 1964), Roger Bolton, *Defense Purchases and Regional Growth* (Washington, 1966), William L. Baldwin, *The Structure of the Defense Market, 1955-1964* (Durham, N.C., 1967), and Vincent Davis, *The Admirals' Lobby* (Chapel Hill, 1967). See also Clive Trebicock, "Legends of the British Armament Industry, 1890-1914," *Journal of Contemporary History*, V (1970), 3-19, and Paul A. C. Koistinen, "The 'Industrial-Military Complex' in Historical Perspective: The Interwar Years," *Journal of American History*, LVI (1970), 819-839.

<sup>2</sup> Fred J. Cook, *The Warfare State* (New York, 1962).

<sup>3</sup> "A National Security State," *The Progressive*, XXXIII (July 1969), 5-6; Juan Bosch, *Pentagonism: A Substitute for Imperialism* (New York, 1968); Murray L. Weidenbaum, "The Defense-Space Complex: Impact on Whom?" *Challenge*, XIII (April 1965), 43-46; Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Farewell Address," *New York Times*, Jan. 18, 1961, p. 22.

<sup>4</sup> Note a similar point of view in Michael D. Reagan, "The Business and Defense Services Administration, 1953-57," *Western Political Quarterly*, XIV (1961), 569-586; Peter d'A. Jones, "The Military-Industrial Complex, 1952-64," in H. H. Quint, et al., eds., *Main Problems in American History* (2 vols., New York, 1965), II, 370-383; and Walter Adams, "The Military-Industrial Complex and the New Industrial State," *American Economic Review*, LVIII (1968), 652-665.

been the individuals considered most vulnerable to its attractions, particularly in those cultures where power has been somewhat decentralized and where one or another group could upset the balance or utilize a crisis to gain advantage. Fear of the ruler and his war-making inclinations is evident as far back as Aristotle and Polybius and appears in its modern form with the rise of liberalism and such thinkers as John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and Thomas Paine.<sup>5</sup> Fear of the warrior, or the military, is also found in the ancient world and becomes clearly visible again in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when the development of standing armies provoked the precautions of the English and American bills of rights as well as warnings from Jean Jacques Rousseau, Thomas Jefferson, and others.<sup>6</sup> Fear that the merchant might find affinity with war makes its appearance with Aristophanes but waits for its modern champions until the time of Karl Marx and the socialist writers who followed him.<sup>7</sup> All of these traditions (and the real dangers), of course, have waxed and waned depending upon the place and time. And just as a history of the Christian church could conceivably be built around the alternating ascendancy of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, so the development of Western reform in modern times might be explained in terms of the successive dominance of political, military, and economic fears.

Yet the thought that two or more of the suspected groups might combine themselves for the sake of war was not unheard of. Especially in

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<sup>5</sup> Aristotle, *The Politics* (London, 1923), bk. VIII, chap. XI; Polybius, *History* (in Kurt von Fritz, *The Theory of the Mixed Constitution in Antiquity* [New York, 1954]), bk. VI, sec. XIV; John Locke, *Of Civil Government: The Second Treatise* (1690), in Peter Laslett, ed., *John Locke: Two Treatises of Government* (Cambridge, 1967), secs. 88, 94–95, 134, 147–149, 221–222; Immanuel Kant, *Eternal Peace* (1795), in Carl J. Friedrich, *Inevitable Peace* (Cambridge, Mass., 1948), sec. 2, art. 1; Thomas Paine, *The Rights of Man* (1791), in Moncure Conway, ed., *The Writings of Thomas Paine* (4 vols., New York, 1967), II, part 2, introduction. For a helpful commentary, see David Rapoport, "Praetorianism: Government without Consensus" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1960).

<sup>6</sup> Aristotle, *Politics*, bk. III, chap. XVI, bk. IV, chap. XIV, and bk. VIII, chap. VI; Aristophanes, *The Peace* (Cambridge, Mass., 1924), lines 440–445; Jean Jacques Rousseau, "Considerations on the Government of Poland" (completed, 1772), in Frederick Watkins, ed., *Rousseau: Political Writings* (Edinburgh, 1953), chap. 12; Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson* (20 vols., Washington, 1905), II, 242, IV, 218, X, 365, XIII, 261, and XIV, 261.

<sup>7</sup> Aristophanes, *Peace*, lines 446–448; Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (1848), (Chicago, 1946), 39; Karl Liebknecht, *Militarism and Anti Militarism* (1907), (Glasgow, ca. 1917), 1–21; Rosa Luxemburg, *The Accumulation of Capital* (1913), (London, 1951), 454–467; G. Zinoviev and V. I. Lenin, *Socialism and War* (1915), in V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works* (23 vols., New York, 1927–1945), XVIII, 214–258. It is worth noting that socialist writers never claimed that there was anything specifically capitalistic about militarism, but only that, in the current economic stage of Western nations, capitalism was responsible for bringing on armaments and war.

the decades before the world wars of this century, as the heat of passions rose and as armaments races accelerated, a tendency grew to see forces coalescing which may have stood to benefit from a continuation of the tension. To what extent such mergings of interest really did take place is difficult to estimate on the basis of present studies. Perhaps the image was largely a function of the emotional temperature, or perhaps not. Possibly the socioeconomic and political pluralism which characterized the Western states was breaking down during these eras, and those individuals who were most fearful of its loss tended to perceive its going first.

Let me return, however, to the three distinct traditions (anti-political, anti-military, anti-economic), bringing them down through time, pointing up certain shifts in meaning which have occurred, and illustrating the routes by which the ideas have both come together and yet survived. Each of these fears is very much alive today and, as we shall see, even in merging with others often remains dominant within the new complex of thought. Indeed, assessing the relative weight of the component anxieties is a useful way to separate and relate the various accusations about the warfare state which are being made today.

As has been noted, fear that the ruler might lead the nation into war for his own ends has a history which dates back to the origins of organized society. It was a prime motive in the modern movement toward limited government and ultimately toward republicanism (for, as Tom Paine said, "What is the history of all monarchical governments but a disgusting picture of human wretchedness, and the accidental respite of a few years' repose? . . . War is their trade, plunder and revenue their objects. While such governments continue, peace has not the absolute security of a day"<sup>8</sup>). Yet even popular elections did not remove the root of the concern, as Abraham Lincoln testified at the time of President James Polk's indiscretions before the Mexican War:

The provision of the Constitution giving the war-making power to Congress was dictated, as I understand it, by the following reasons: Kings had always been involving and impoverishing their people in wars, pretending generally, if not always, that the good of the people was the object. This our [Constitutional] convention understood to be the most oppressive of all kingly oppressions, and they resolved to so frame the Constitution that no one man should hold the power of bringing this oppression upon us.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Paine, *Rights of Man*, II, Introduction.

<sup>9</sup> John G. Nicolay and John Hay, *Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln* (12 vols., New York, 1905), I, 111-112.

In our own day we have witnessed a continuation of this anxiety in such American developments as congressional criticism of Woodrow Wilson's maintaining troops abroad after World War I,<sup>10</sup> widespread charges in the 1940s that Franklin D. Roosevelt had "lied us into war,"<sup>11</sup> and recent chafing at the relinquishment of power to the executive in the Formosa Straits Resolution and the Tonkin Gulf Resolution.<sup>12</sup> In fact, in the period between the world wars there were considerable efforts made to take the matter of war and peace out of the hands of government entirely, a design perhaps most obvious in the referendum requirement of the proposed Ludlow Amendment (1938).

Anti-militarism, too, builds on a long and proud tradition, stretching back in England to the age of Cromwell and on the continent at least as far as the Enlightenment. Rousseau described armies as "the pest which depopulated Europe" and Kant thought them dangerous because "they threaten other states continually with war by their readiness to appear always ready for war; they incite states to excel in the number of armed men, to which no limit is set; and when by the costs it involves, peace becomes even more burdensome than a short war, armies themselves furnish the reason for aggressive war in order to get rid of this burden."<sup>13</sup> Dread of unnecessary war and fear that, as George Mason put it, "once a standing army is established in any country, the people lose their liberty"<sup>14</sup> were the primary reasons for the longstanding American insistence on civilian dominance over the military and on a leading role for the militia,<sup>15</sup> policies which found their parallels abroad, particularly in Britain. Though anti-militarism fell off in the nineteenth century under the impact of industrialization and Social Darwinism, it experienced a vigorous rebirth in the 1890s in response to rising navalism, jingoism, and imperialism.<sup>16</sup> The Dreyfus case in France and socialist pacifism

<sup>10</sup> E.g., Peter D. Filene, *Americans and the Soviet Experiment, 1917-33* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), 51.

<sup>11</sup> The phrase was coined by Congresswoman Clare Booth Luce in 1944 (*New York Times*, Oct. 14, 1944, p. 9). For a further example of this point of view, see William Henry Chamberlin, "The Bankruptcy of a Policy," in Harry Elmer Barnes, ed., *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace* (Caldwell, Idaho, 1953), 489.

<sup>12</sup> Eric F. Goldman, *The Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson* (New York, 1969), 410-411.

<sup>13</sup> Alfred Vagts, *A History of Militarism, Civilian and Military* (rev. ed.; New York, 1959), 76-77.

<sup>14</sup> "The Military Peril; The Virginia Convention," in Russell F. Weigley, ed., *The American Military: Readings in the History of the Military in American Society* (Reading, Mass., 1969), 63.

<sup>15</sup> For discussion, see Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., *The Civilian and the Military* (New York, 1956); Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, Mass., 1957); and Marcus Cunliffe, *Soldiers and Civilians: The Martial Spirit in America, 1775-1865* (Boston, 1969).

<sup>16</sup> Ekirch, *Civilian and Military*, 124-139; Curti, *Peace or War*, 136-165. For examples of the primary literature, see Edward Berwick, "American Militarism," *Century*, XLVII (1893),

generally were strong indications of a new hostility towards the army,<sup>17</sup> and following the world wars continuing distrust was revealed in such developments as American opposition to Universal Military Training, the worldwide movement for disarmament in the 1920s, and Allied decisions to ban the German and Japanese military establishments after 1945.<sup>18</sup>

In turning to our third line of thought—that which fears the business man as provocateur—one cannot resist quoting Aristophanes' fervent prayer that, "If any merchant, selling spears or shields, would fain have battles to improve his trade, may he be seized by thieves and eat raw barley!"<sup>19</sup> In this case also there is a venerable tradition, but a tradition which remained largely in eclipse during the long bourgeois climb to predominance in Europe. As a matter of fact, in the early nineteenth century Auguste Comte and others were so impressed with the potential of industrialization that they came to see history as a unilinear movement from the "military" society of the past to the "industrial" society of the future, with the two types representing the polar extremes of social organization.<sup>20</sup> This was the view of Herbert Spencer, too, who contended that "with an increasing ratio of industrialism . . . there has been . . . a strengthening assertion of individuality . . . [and with it] a growing respect for the individualities of others."<sup>21</sup> A similar perspective was reflected later in the work of William Graham Sumner, Norman Angell, Thorstein Veblen, and Joseph Schumpeter.<sup>22</sup> It required the

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316–317; A. B. Ronne, "The Spirit of Militarism," *Popular Science Monthly*, XLVII (1895), 234–239; Joseph Dana Miller, "Militarism or Manhood," *Arena*, XXIV (1900), 379–392; Urbain Gohier, "The Danger of Militarism," *The Independent*, LII (1900), 233–236; and Gustave Hervé, "Anti-Militarism in France," *ibid.*, LIV (1904), 2170–2173.

<sup>17</sup> David Thomson, *Democracy in France* (London, 1946), 147–161. See also Liebknecht, *Militarism*, 89–136.

<sup>18</sup> See L. B. Wheildon, "Militarization," *Editorial Research Report* (May 1948); Robert H. Ferrell, *Peace in Their Time: The Origins of the Kellogg-Briand Pact* (New Haven, 1952); John W. Wheeler-Bennett, *The Reduction of Armaments* (London, 1925); Wheeler-Bennett, *Disarmament and Security Since Locarno* (London, 1932); William E. Rappard, *The Quest for Peace Since the World War* (Cambridge, Mass., 1940); Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (Garden City, N.Y., 1950), 17; and William J. Sebald, *With MacArthur in Japan* (New York, 1965), 79–83.

<sup>19</sup> Aristophanes, *Peace*, lines 446–448.

<sup>20</sup> Raymond Aron, "War and Industrial Society," in Leon Bramson and George W. Goethals, eds., *War: Studies from Psychology, Sociology, Anthropology* (New York, 1964), 352–359; Huntington, *Soldier and State*, 222–226.

<sup>21</sup> Herbert Spencer, "The Military and the Industrial Society," in Bramson and Goethals, *War*, 308.

<sup>22</sup> William Graham Sumner, *War and Other Essays* (New Haven, 1911), 13, 28–30; Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion* (New York, 1910), 198–221; Thorstein Veblen, *An Inquiry into the Nature of Peace and the Terms of Its Perpetuation* (New York, 1917), 196–200; and Joseph Schum-

belligerent national expansionism of the 1880s and 1890s before even socialist intellectuals could develop that critique of the capitalist's role in international conflict at which Marx himself had hinted.<sup>23</sup> These were the years in which the Second International began to protest the "militarism" of the owning classes,<sup>24</sup> and it was in 1902 that J. A. Hobson, in his classic attack on imperialism, made the matter emphatically clear:

Our economic analysis has disclosed the fact that it is only the interests of competing cliques of business men—investors, contractors, export manufacturers, and certain professional classes—that are antagonistic; that these cliques, usurping the authority and voice of the people, use the public resources to push their private interests, and spend the blood and money of the people in this vast and disastrous military game, feigning national antagonisms which have no basis in reality.<sup>25</sup>

Since Hobson's day this set of charges has never really been disproved, and has recurred from time to time not only in Soviet attacks against the West, but also during the Anglo-American munitions investigations of the 1930s and on the occasion of Allied attempts to break up German and Japanese industrial monopolies after World War II.<sup>26</sup>

With the rising international tension of 1900–1917, it was to be expected that all three of the traditional fears—the political, military, and economic—would come more and more into prominence. In Europe, where socialists were carrying the principal burden of reform, it was naturally the capitalists who were most frequently blamed (when other nations were *not*) for rampant "militarism."<sup>27</sup> In America, on the other hand, where the middle class was at the heart of both progressivism and the peace movement, it was the ruler and the soldier who were usually

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peter, *Imperialism [and] Social Classes* (New York, 1951), 92–96. For an earlier example of Spencer's influence, see Ronne, cited above. Note also Edmund Silberner, *The Problem of War in Nineteenth Century Economic Thought* (Princeton, 1946), *passim*.

<sup>23</sup> Marx and Engels, *Communist Manifesto*, 39.

<sup>24</sup> Julius Braunthal, *History of the International* (2 vols., New York, 1967), I, 325–329.

<sup>25</sup> J. A. Hobson, *Imperialism: A Study* (London, 1902), 127.

<sup>26</sup> See John E. Wiltz, *In Search of Peace: The Senate Munitions Inquiry, 1934–36* (Baton Rouge, 1963); J. D. Scott, *Vickers: A History* (London, 1962), 238–256; Clay, *Decision*, 325–334; Sebald, *With MacArthur*, 87–89.

<sup>27</sup> For evidence of this, see Braunthal, *International*, I, 329–348; Carl E. Schorske, *German Social Democracy, 1905–1917* (Cambridge, Mass., 1955), 66–87, 241–250; Harvey Goldberg, *The Life of Jean Jaurès* (Madison, 1962), 417–457; and Arthur Marwick, *Britain in the Century of Total War* (London, 1968), 50–51. The primary literature includes such writings as Guglielmo Ferrero, *Il Militarismo* (Milan, 1898); Liebknecht, *Militarism*; Luxemburg, *Capital*; Francis McCullagh, *Syndicates for War* (Boston, 1911); and Francis Delaisi, "Le Patriotisme des plaques blindées," *La Paix par le Droit*, XXIV (1913), 65–74, 129–138, 286–296.



held responsible.<sup>28</sup> Yet there were many shades of opinion on both sides of the Atlantic. Kaiser Wilhelm was criticized in Germany (and elsewhere), just as Theodore Roosevelt was called to task at home for "his constant encouragement of the military spirit."<sup>29</sup> And in 1913, 120,000 Frenchmen demonstrated against the three-year army service bill, in seeming agreement with an American who asserted that "It is because the nations of the Old World have given themselves so largely to the guidance of military experts that modern civilization finds itself so handicapped and plagued."<sup>30</sup> Meanwhile, other Americans were attacking the "powder trust" with much the same spirit that George Bernard Shaw had revealed in *Major Barbara* when the armament maker Under-shaft told his audience, "You will make war when it suits us and keep peace when it doesn't. . . . When I want anything to keep my dividends up, you will call out the police and the military."<sup>31</sup>

Moreover, particularly after 1910, as crisis appeared imminent, it began to seem to many that the villains in the story were linking forces. "We are in the hands of an organization of crooks," cried Lord Welby in the British Parliament early in 1914. "They are politicians, generals, manufacturers of armaments and journalists. All of them are anxious for unlimited expenditure, and go on inventing scares to terrify the public."<sup>32</sup> A few weeks later, the Socialist MP Philip Snowden spoke out to document these charges "to the hilt," taking particular care to point up the considerable personal investment by members of the government in armaments firms, and the way in which retired generals and admirals

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<sup>28</sup> Curti, *Peace or War*, 196-227. See also Julius Moritzen, *The Peace Movement of America* (New York, 1912); and Marie Louise Degen, *The History of the Woman's Peace Party* (Baltimore, 1939). For examples of the primary literature, see E. H. Crosby, *Swords and Plowshares* (New York, 1902); Crosby, *The Absurdities of Militarism* (Boston, 1907); Charles E. Jefferson, "Some Fallacies of Militarism," *The Independent*, LXIV (1908), 457-460; Jefferson, "The Delusion of Militarism," *Atlantic Monthly*, CIII (1909), 379-388; A. C. Coolidge, *The Scoundrel of Militarism* (Worcester, 1911); and Peter Ainslie, *The Scourge of Militarism* (New York, 1914).

<sup>29</sup> Michael Balfour, *The Kaiser and His Times* (Boston, 1964), 241-302; "A Parting Glance at Roosevelt," *Nation*, LXXXVIII (1909), 240-241.

<sup>30</sup> Michael Curtis, *Three Against the Third Republic: Sorel, Barrès, and Maurras* (Princeton, 1959), 43; D. W. Brogan, *The Development of Modern France, 1870-1939* (2 vols., New York, 1966), II, 428-431; the quotation is from Jefferson, "Some Fallacies," 460.

<sup>31</sup> E.g., William H. S. Stevens, *The Powder Trust, 1872-1912* (Philadelphia, 1912); Charles Edward Russell, "For Patriotism and Profits," *Pearson's Magazine*, XXX (1913), 545-556. See also the statements of Senator Robert La Follette on February 12, 1915, in the *Cong. Rec.*, 63 Cong., 3 sess., 3632-3633; and the remarks of Representative Clyde H. Tavenner on December 15, 1915, in the *Cong. Rec.*, 64 Cong., 1 sess., 272-293; the latter were later amplified and published as *The World-Wide War Trust* (Washington, 1916). The quotation is from George Bernard Shaw, *Major Barbara* (London, 1905), Act III.

<sup>32</sup> George Seldes, *Iron, Blood and Profits* (New York, 1934), 333. The reference is to the citation of these remarks in Phillip Snowden's later speech.

were being hired by arms contractors because they (the military officers) "knew the ropes."<sup>33</sup> "In every country and across every border," contended the English liberal, H. N. Brailsford, "there is a powerful group of capitalists, closely allied to the fighting services, firmly entrenched in society, and well served by politicians and journalists, whose business it is to exploit the rivalries and jealousies of nations."<sup>34</sup> Allegations such as these, to be sure, became less common in Britain after war had been declared,<sup>35</sup> but it is interesting to note with what eagerness the conservatives adopted them for use against the enemy, who was quickly demonized in the shape of Kaiser, Krupp, and Tirpitz.<sup>36</sup> In the interim, as the preparedness controversy raged in the United States, American radicals picked up the cry against the international alliance of "the generals and the Krupps, Armstrongs, and Du Ponts."<sup>37</sup>

Even so, the war came and went, and peace brought a return to more pluralist perspectives. In Paris in 1919 the Americans wrote a provision into the League Covenant requiring members to "agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections,"<sup>38</sup> and in the next few years the League of

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<sup>33</sup> Seldes, *Iron, Blood and Profits*, 333–340; Philip Viscount Snowden, *An Autobiography* (2 vols., London, 1934), I, 244–251. Snowden admits to having been heavily dependent on the research of J. T. Walton Newbold, who makes similar charges in *The War Trust Exposed* (London, 1914). So does George H. Perris in *The War Traders: An Exposure* (London, 1914).

<sup>34</sup> Henry Noel Brailsford, *The War of Steel and Gold: A Study of the Armed Peace* (London, 1914), 92–93.

<sup>35</sup> Radical criticism did continue to appear, however, with such publications as H. Robertson Murray, *Krupp's and the International Armaments Ring* (London, 1914); Union of Democratic Control, *The International Industry of War* (London, 1915); and J. T. Walton Newbold, *How Europe Armed for War* (London, 1916). For a helpful bibliography of this period, see John Mez, *Peace Literature of the War* (New York, 1916).

<sup>36</sup> See Irene Cooper Willis, *England's Holy War* (New York, 1928), 86–134. One could, perhaps, advance the theory that, as long as conservatives were in power, they tended to see abroad what radicals saw both at home and abroad.

<sup>37</sup> Lucia Ames Mead, "America's Danger and Opportunity," *Survey*, XXXV (1915), 90. See, in addition, Charles E. Jefferson, "Military Preparedness as a Peril to Democracy," *The Annals*, LXVI (1916), 228–236; Arthur Capper, "The West and Preparedness," *The Independent*, LXXXV (1916), 49–50; Allan L. Benson, *Inviting War to America* (New York, 1916), 8, 23–25; and David Starr Jordan, *War and Waste* (Garden City, N.Y., 1918), 102–104. Yet Scott Nearing, in *The Menace of Militarism* (New York, 1917), 9–17, was still incited to blame the capitalists almost exclusively. For a recent examination of what actually occurred to American business, government, and the military after 1917, see Paul A. C. Koistenen, "The Industrial-Military Complex in Historical Perspective: World War I," *Business History Review*, XLI (1967), 378–403. There is a parallel study for Germany entitled *Total War and Compulsory Labor: A Study of the Military-Industrial Complex in Germany during World War I*, by Robert B. Armeson (The Hague, 1964).

<sup>38</sup> Covenant of the League of Nations, Art. VIII, sec. 5. See also Manley O. Hudson, "Private Enterprise and Public War," *New Republic*, XXVIII (Nov. 16, 1921, supplement), 26–30; and Scott, *Vickers*, 238–241.

Nations took up the question of controlling armaments firms.<sup>39</sup> At the same time, on the popular level, the politician and the soldier were each subjected to considerable criticism. French statesmen, for example, were severely pummeled in the British and American press for refusing to disarm,<sup>40</sup> while the establishment of a publicity bureau in the United States War Department in 1926 led to charges that "in scores of ways the military are entering our civil life, arrogating to themselves . . . a vigorous leadership they were never meant to have."<sup>41</sup>

Then, with the end of the decade, the onset of the Depression, and the breakdown of stability, the mood of the matter changed again, and the industrialist became the paramount "warmonger." Indeed, growing economic radicalism and fear of future conflict led to a deluge of books attacking munitions makers which was not to be equaled in volume until the comparable inundation of the 1960s.<sup>42</sup> The titles can give only some indication of the fury: *The Bloody International*; *Death and Profits*; *Patriotism Limited*; *Enemies of Peace*; *The Bloody Traffic*; *Iron, Blood and Profits*; and *Merchants of Death*.<sup>43</sup> The charges being brought, in most cases, were the same: that the weapons manufacturers were organized in interlocking directorates, that they equipped nations indiscriminately (including enemies of their own), that they made unheard of profits, that they fomented war scares in order to maximize sales, that they corrupted the press and governments for their own ends, that they worked in close cooperation with patriotic societies, and that their intrigues were largely responsible both for the world war and more recent conflicts. Here and there among these writings were also hints of accusation against different "guilty" parties (for example, against "governments driven by the economic crisis" which "work hand in hand with armament

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<sup>39</sup> Ralph H. Stimson, *The War System* (Washington, 1933), 9–14; C. D. Judd, *Traffic in Armaments* (Dallas, 1934), 13–20. As part of its effort, the League published *A Statistical Yearbook of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition* (Geneva, 1925–1945).

<sup>40</sup> Selig Adler, *The Isolationist Impulse* (New York, 1957), 144.

<sup>41</sup> H. A. Overstreet, "Militarizing Our Minds," *The World Tomorrow*, IX (1926), 144; Harry F. Ward, "Free Speech for the Army," *New Republic*, LI (1927), 194–196.

<sup>42</sup> For the best bibliography available, see H. C. Engelbrecht and F. C. Hanighen, *Merchants of Death* (New York, 1934), 285–296.

<sup>43</sup> Otto Lehmann-Russbueldt, *Die blütige Internationale der Rüstungsindustrie* (Hamburg, 1929; translated as *War for Profits*, New York, 1930); Seymour Waldman, *Death and Profits: A Study of the War Policies Commission* (New York, 1932); Union of Democratic Control, *Patriotism Limited: An Exposure of the War Machine* (London, 1933); George A. Drew, *Enemies of Peace: An Exposé of Armament Manufacturers* (Toronto, 1933); A. Fenner Brockway, *The Bloody Traffic* (London, 1933); Seldes, *Iron, Blood and Profits*; and Engelbrecht and Hanighen, *Merchants of Death*.

manufacturers";<sup>44</sup> and against military officers who upon retirement pass "into the service of armament firms"<sup>45</sup>), but it was clearly the capitalists who bore the major portion of the blame.

There were competitive if less vocal schools of thought in the 1930s, however, which emphasized the danger of war from other directions. Among these, the anti-political and anti-military interpretations were ably represented, both being heavily influenced by what was then occurring in Germany, Japan, and Russia. In the conservative polemic *Democratic Despotism*, for instance, Raoul Desvernine warned that Roosevelt's New Deal was fast on its way to becoming like those dictatorships abroad which "strive to consolidate their power by building up in the minds of their people the bugaboo of danger from other nations."<sup>46</sup> And Sinclair Lewis, in his novel *It Can't Happen Here*, depicted a cabinet officer in a future, fascist America arguing that whereas "once . . . governments had merely let themselves slide into a war, thanking Providence for having provided a conflict as a febrifuge against internal discontent, . . . in this age of deliberate, planned propaganda, a really modern government . . . must figure out what brand of war they [sic] had to sell and plan the selling-campaign consciously."<sup>47</sup> On the military side, Charles Beard in *The Navy: Defense or Portent* worried about preventing "army and navy bureaucrats" from pushing the country into a foreign policy of "brag and bluster."<sup>48</sup> And Harold Lasswell looked even further into the future in his article, "Sino-Japanese Crisis: The Garrison State versus the Civilian State," unveiling a vision which has profoundly disturbed and influenced students of war down to the present day. Voicing the severest doubts about the ability of civilian institutions to survive prolonged international crisis, Lasswell hypothesized that the "business state" of the present would gradually give way to a "garrison state" in which the "specialists on violence," that is, the military commanders, would have mastered and subordinated busi-

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<sup>44</sup> Union of Democratic Control, *Patriotism Limited*, 5.

<sup>45</sup> Union of Democratic Control, *The Secret International: Armament Firms at Work* (London, 1933), 29. In this regard, note also the findings of the Nye Committee, as discussed in Koistenen, "The InterWar Years," 831-833.

<sup>46</sup> Raoul E. Desvernine, *Democratic Despotism* (New York, 1936), 87.

<sup>47</sup> Sinclair Lewis, *It Can't Happen Here: A Novel* (Garden City, N.Y., 1945), 418-419. During this period the American Right tended to fear that a war would assist the Left in establishing a collectivist dictatorship, while the Left suspected that belligerency would have just the opposite result, strengthening the Right to the point of making fascism possible.

<sup>48</sup> Charles A. Beard, *The Navy: Defense or Portent?* (New York, 1932), 13.

nessmen, party leaders, government officials, and the nation at large.<sup>49</sup>

Once again, the closer war actually came, the more those who tended to blame interest groups for this saw their enemies coalescing. Accusing the admirals and diplomats of wanting to build a "super-navy" and attacking the President for refusing to specify policy, the *Nation's* editor, Oswald Garrison Villard, was frank to admit fear that paring down the armed forces would require "the over-ruling of a tremendously powerful military and naval machine and its lobby, plus the unnumerable elements which profit by a huge Army and Navy."<sup>50</sup> Similarly, John T. Flynn decried the "liberal idealists . . . , old-time Republican reactionaries, professional militarists, and political junkers" who were ganging up with businessmen to create a war industry which "you cannot demobilize . . . and you will have to keep on inventing reasons for. . . ." <sup>51</sup> The *New Republic* expressed its great concern at some of the "hysterical suggestions" being made, which if followed, it believed, could eventuate in a "capitalist-military oligarchy."<sup>52</sup>

World War II itself, while dampening such pessimism, did allow these ideas to survive or appear in other guises. By the end of the struggle Charles E. Wilson, vice-chairman of the War Production Board (and later Eisenhower's Secretary of Defense), was so impressed by the experience of mobilization that he urged a group of high-ranking officers and businessmen to guard against future Pearl Harbors by embarking on a program of "full [peace-time] preparedness according to a continuing plan." "The burden," he said, "is on all of us to integrate our

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<sup>49</sup> Harold D. Lasswell, "Sino-Japanese Crisis: The Garrison State versus the Civilian State," *China Quarterly*, II (1937), 643-649. The influence of Herbert Spencer is particularly evident in this article, although, of course, Lasswell tended to see history as flowing in exactly the opposite direction.

<sup>50</sup> Oswald Garrison Villard, *Our Military Chaos: The Truth About Defense* (New York, 1939), 105-115. Villard had been somewhat more traditional in his anti-militarism earlier in the 1930s, and he was to return to that position after World War II. For his earlier attitudes, see Villard, "We Militarize," *Atlantic Monthly*, CLVII (1936), 138-149, and, for his later, note Villard, *How America is Being Militarized* (New York, 1947).

<sup>51</sup> John T. Flynn, "The Armament Bandwagon," *New Republic*, XCVIII (1939), 121-123. Among others who saw a similar danger were Maurice A. Hallgren, "War," in Harold E. Stearns, ed., *America Now* (New York, 1938); Eugene Staley, "Power Economy versus Welfare Economy," *The Annals*, CXCVIII (1938), 9-14; and George Soule, "After the New Deal: The New Political Landscape," *New Republic*, XCIX (1939), 35-38. After World War II Flynn's views were to become much more conservative, but even in his classic attack on "creeping socialism," *The Road Ahead* (New York, 1949), he would argue against becoming dependent upon "a 'war' economy" (see p. 8). That such criticism as Villard's and Flynn's had an impact on the Roosevelt administration is attested by the President's sudden abandonment in late 1939 of the newly appointed War Resources Board (WRB); for this, see Koistenen, "The InterWar Years," 836-838.

<sup>52</sup> "The Way to Prepare," *New Republic*, CII (1940), 715-716.

respective activities—political, military, and industrial—because we are in world politics to stay, whether we like it or not.”<sup>53</sup> It was shortly before this that James Forrestal, the Secretary of the Navy, had organized several large war contractors into the National Security Industrial Association, ostensibly with the same objective in mind.<sup>54</sup>

Yet, surprisingly, the intensity of the Cold War which followed was not severe enough for combinations of this kind to prosper or for concern about them to develop. Fear as such was not extinguished, to be sure, but the eagerness with which American industry reconverted to civilian production after V-J Day, together with the sudden prominence of military men in the early Truman administration, apparently broke up both the image and reality of the warfare state in its tripartite sense. At least the fact is that for almost a decade after 1945, while conservatives institutionalized their longstanding misgivings about the presidency in the 22nd Amendment (ratified, interestingly enough, in a sudden rush only three months after the Chinese crossed the Yalu),<sup>55</sup> the uneasiness of the Left regarding domestic “warmongering” was centered primarily on the armed forces. Harold Lasswell’s concepts became the order of the day, especially in the form which he had given to them in those post-war extensions of his thesis that he called the “garrison-prison state” and the “garrison-police state.”<sup>56</sup> Perhaps the most vivid presentation of such ideas was to be found in George Orwell’s gruesome novel, *1984*,<sup>57</sup> but their presence was unmistakable in numerous editorials and articles which lamented the growing prestige of the defense establishment, its hold over public and congressional opinion, and its influence in high-

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<sup>53</sup> *New York Times*, Jan. 20, 1944, p. 1 ff. The First World War, apparently, had inspired similar reactions on the part of German conservatives; see, for example, A. T. Lauterbach, “Militarism in the Western World,” *Journal of the History of Ideas*, V (1944), 474–477.

<sup>54</sup> John W. Swomley, Jr., *The Military Establishment* (Boston, 1964), 101. See also Bruce Catton, *The War Lords of Washington* (New York, 1948), 211, 313; Barton J. Bernstein, “The Debate on Industrial Reconversion: The Protection of Oligopoly and Military Control of the Economy,” *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, XXVI (1967), 159–172; and Paul Goodman, “A Causerie at the Military Industrial,” *New York Review of Books*, IX (Nov. 23, 1967), 14–19. Note, as well, Perry McCoy Smith, *The Air Force Plans for Peace, 1943–1954* (Baltimore, 1969).

<sup>55</sup> Donald A. Morgan, *Congress and the Constitution: A Study of Responsibility* (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), 226–245.

<sup>56</sup> See Harold D. Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” *American Journal of Sociology*, XLVI (1941), 455–468; Lasswell, “The Universal Peril: Perpetual Crisis and the Garrison-Prison State,” in Lyman Bryson et al., eds., *Perspectives on a Troubled Decade* (New York, 1950); Lasswell, *National Security and Individual Freedom* (New York, 1950); and Lasswell, “Does the Garrison State Threaten Civil Rights?” *The Annals*, CCLXXV (1951), 111–116. Note also Lasswell, “The Garrison State Hypothesis Today,” in Samuel P. Huntington, ed., *Changing Patterns of Military Politics* (New York, 1962), 51–70.

<sup>57</sup> George Orwell, *1984* (New York, 1948), 417–419.

level decision-making.<sup>58</sup> "The military are getting the bit in their teeth," contended Hanson Baldwin in 1947, and "there is considerable evidence that their objective is absolute preparedness in time of peace, an objective which has led all nations which have sought it to the garrison state, bankruptcy, and ruin."<sup>59</sup> Five years later Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas was quite typical in insisting that the greatest threat to democracy lay in trusting "the military clique that spreads [itself] slowly throughout the government, expanding its hold."<sup>60</sup>

Not until the middle 1950s and America's unexpected failure to reduce its post-Korean military expenditures did critics of the situation begin to enlarge upon their explanations once again. A striking series of articles in the *Nation* by Matthew Josephson both signalled the change and helped to usher in the return to accusations of merging interests.<sup>61</sup> Josephson was quickly followed, however, by an even more effective spokesman for this point of view in C. Wright Mills, a Columbia University sociologist whose book, *The Power Elite* (1956), was to become one of the classic attacks upon pluralist thought in the United States. Briefly, Mills' assertion was that since World War II the "decisive political relevance" of the military leadership had thrust it into the ranks of the corporate and political elites which, in his view, had long dominated American society. "American capitalism is now in considerable part a military capitalism," he wrote, "and the most important relation of the big corporation to the state rests on the coincidence of interests between military and corporate needs, as defined by [the] warlords and corporate rich. . . . Of the three types of circle that compose the power elite today, it is the military that has benefited the most

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<sup>58</sup> For example, "A Militarized America," *Christian Century*, LXIII (1946), 390-391; Lewis Mumford, "Social Effects," *Air Affairs*, I (1947), 370-382; Committee for Economic Development, "The Threat of a Garrison State," *American Affairs*, XII (1950), 114-120. An interesting embellishment on Lasswell's argument is provided by Louis Smith in "The Garrison State: Offspring of the Cold War," *Nation*, CLXXVII (1953), 461-464. Smith is really more concerned about the politician than about the military.

<sup>59</sup> Hanson W. Baldwin, "The Military Move In," *Harper's*, CXCIV (1947), 481-489.

<sup>60</sup> William O. Douglas, "Should We Fear the Military?" *Look*, XVI (March 11, 1952), 34. One striking exception to the trend was Henry A. Wallace, who blamed both "Big Brass" and "Big Gold" for the Cold War; note, especially, his "Whipped Up Hysteria," *New Republic*, CXVIII (March 29, 1948), 10, and his "Farewell and Hail!," *New Republic*, CXIX (July 19, 1948), 14-18. Another untypical voice was that of Ray Jackson, who, in "Aspects of American Militarism," *Contemporary Issues*, I (Summer 1948), 19-24, expressed the fear that "certain sections of industry have an interest" in helping the military achieve "domestic Spartanisation."

<sup>61</sup> Matthew Josephson, "The Big Guns," *Nation*, CLXXXII (1956), 30-33, 50-52, and 69-72.

in its enhanced power. . . . It is the professional politician who has lost the most."<sup>62</sup>



Since 1956, and especially since Eisenhower's famous warning of 1961, there has been a steady growth of concern and publication regarding the dangers to peace from coalescing interest groups. Eisenhower, of course, differed from Mills both in ignoring the governmental aspect of the problem and in treating the whole thing as largely in the future,<sup>63</sup> but there have been others before and after him who lean more directly on Mills, including Fred J. Cook (*The Warfare State*, 1962), Irwin Suall (*The American Ultras*, 1962), and Victor Perlo (*Militarism and Industry*, 1963).<sup>64</sup> Less elitist and less radical than these authors, but equally troubled by political-military-industrial "cooperation," are Julius Duscha (*Arms, Money and Politics*, 1964), H. L. Nieburg (*In the Name of Science*, 1966), John Kenneth Galbraith (*The New Industrial State*, 1967, *How to Control the Military*, 1969), and Ralph Lapp (*The Weapons Culture*, 1968).<sup>65</sup> Nieburg, in a sense, speaks for all when he writes:

For almost three decades the nation's resources have been commanded by military needs, and political and economic power have been consolidated behind defense priorities. What was initially sustained by emergency has been normalized through a cabal of vested interests. . . . The so-called military-industrial complex is not a conspiracy but rather a culmination of historical trends. It is a fact of contemporary public life that is eating the heart out of our society, reducing potential for real economic and social growth and eroding the foundation of democratic pluralism.<sup>66</sup>

A wide variety of other diagnoses are also being propounded. There remain those pluralists who, while sensing danger, see it deriving primarily from one sector of society, as Arthur Schlesinger apparently does in his recent attack upon the "warrior class" in *The Crisis of Confidence*.<sup>67</sup>

<sup>62</sup> C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York, 1956), 276. Note, for discussion, G. William Domhoff and Hoyt B. Ballard, eds., *C. Wright Mills and the Power Elite* (Boston, 1968).

<sup>63</sup> See, in this regard, Arnold M. Rose, *The Power Structure: Political Process in American Society* (New York, 1967), 26-39.

<sup>64</sup> Cook, *The Warfare State*; Irwin Suall, *The American Ultras: The Extreme Right and the Military-Industrial Complex* (New York, 1962); Victor Perlo, *Militarism and Industry: Arms Profiteering in the Missile Age* (New York, 1963).

<sup>65</sup> Julius Duscha, *Arms, Money, and Politics* (New York, 1964); H. L. Nieburg, *In the Name of Science* (Chicago, 1966); John Kenneth Galbraith, *The New Industrial State* (Boston, 1967); Galbraith, *How to Control the Military* (New York, 1969); Ralph E. Lapp, *The Weapons Culture* (New York, 1968).

<sup>66</sup> Nieburg, *Science*, 380-381.

<sup>67</sup> Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Crisis of Confidence: Ideas, Power, and Violence in America* (Boston, 1969), 165-174.



There are those observers, too, who, accepting the major outlines of the warfare state, tend to view one or another of the leading groups as predominant within it. Jack Raymond (*Power at the Pentagon*, 1964), for example, fears "civilian militarists" in Washington,<sup>68</sup> while John Swomley (*The Military Establishment*, 1964) is more suspicious of the military itself,<sup>69</sup> and Tristram Coffin (*The Armed Society*, 1964) and G. William Domhoff (*Who Rules America?*, 1967) argue that the generals have been "co-opted" by the corporate rich.<sup>70</sup> Some critics assent to the military-industrial complex only to extend it with an "academic" or "scientific" or even "labor" factor,<sup>71</sup> taking an approach which harks back to another part of Eisenhower's farewell admonition ("We must also be alert to the . . . danger that public policy could . . . become the captive of a scientific-technological elite") and pushes in the direction of making an accusation against American society as a whole, such as those formulated by Marc Pilisuk and Thomas Hayden in their article, "Is There a Military Industrial Complex Which Prevents Peace?" (1965) and in the anonymous, deadly hoax entitled *Report from Iron Mountain* (1967).<sup>72</sup> Meanwhile, there are still a few optimistic liberals like Kenneth Boulding, an economist who thinks that disarmament could be accomplished with relative ease and finds little evidence "that . . . the private sector of the war industry in any way dominates defense decisions."<sup>73</sup> There are also increasing numbers of conservatives who

<sup>68</sup> Jack Raymond, *Power at the Pentagon* (New York, 1964), 319-334. Raymond focuses on the Department of Defense, but certain other writers find the most sinister of these "civilian militarists" in the Central Intelligence Agency. See, e.g. David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, *The Invisible Government* (New York, 1964), 3-6, 350-352; and the editorial entitled "American Militarism," *New Republic*, CLX (April 12, 1969), 7-9.

<sup>69</sup> Swomley, cited above. Swomley seems to have gravitated recently toward a more "balanced" view of the warfare state, as indicated in his "Economic Basis of the Cold War," *Christian Century*, LXXXV (1968), 581-585. Yet there are still many Americans who believe that the military is the leading partner; e.g., David M. Shoup, "The New American Militarism," *Atlantic Monthly*, CCXXIII (April, 1969), 51-56.

<sup>70</sup> Tristram Coffin, *The Passion of the Hawks* (also published as *The Armed Society*, both, New York, 1964); G. William Domhoff, *Who Rules America?* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1967), 115-131. Gabriel Kolko agrees with Coffin and Domhoff in *The Roots of American Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Power and Purpose* (Boston, 1969), 30-37.

<sup>71</sup> Note, for instance, Sidney Lens, *The Military-Industrial Complex* (Philadelphia, and Kansas City, Mo., 1970). See also Eugene J. McCarthy, "The Powers of the Pentagon," *Saturday Review*, LI (Dec. 21, 1968), 8-10; Michael T. Klare, "Science for the Pentagon: The Secret Thinkers," *Nation*, CCVI (1968), 503-504; and Eric Sevareid, "American Militarism; What Is It Doing To Us?," *Look*, XXXIII (Aug. 12, 1969), 14-16. Sevareid speaks of a "military-industrial-academic-labor union-congressional complex."

<sup>72</sup> Marc Pilisuk and Thomas Hayden, "Is There a Military Industrial Complex Which Prevents Peace? Consensus and Countervailing Power in Pluralistic Systems," *Journal of Social Issues*, XXI (Jan. 1965), 67-117; anonymous, *Report from Iron Mountain* (New York, 1967).

<sup>73</sup> Kenneth Boulding, "The Role of the War Industry in International Conflict," *Journal of Social Issues*, XXII (Jan. 1967), 54-55. This is not to say that Boulding in any sense endorses

are willing to admit that a military-industrial link exists, but who deny collusion within it and who perceive the relationship as an "essential element of our national survival."<sup>74</sup> There are even authors who suggest that the warfare state is an international development, with the American situation having its counterpart today in the Soviet Union<sup>75</sup>—a theory which serves to remind us just how parochial many of our recent critics have tended to become.<sup>76</sup>

Thus, the warfare state as an accusation has a long and varied history. Its three constituent traditions, which hold ruler, soldier, and merchant responsible for war, wind back their separate paths through many centuries. And the merging of these notions into fear that such men may combine against the peace dates back at least as far as 1910.

Such a perspective should be helpful in the questions that it raises. What role *have* various groups (or functional types) played in the bringing on of wars? And why have certain groups been blamed? And by whom? In what ways does pluralism really suffer in a crisis situation? And can declining pluralism engender combinations of interests which then are in some sense peculiarly prone to war? Did the nations of the West become warfare states in the years before 1914? Or before 1939? Or before 1971? Or were and are these ideas largely myths, compounded out of psychological necessity, or for use as instruments of social change? The research and writing to answer queries such as these is begging to be done.

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America's vast defense expenditures, a fact that he makes very clear in the interesting symposium edited by Erwin Knoll and Judith McFadden, *American Militarism 1970* (New York, 1969), 89–95.

<sup>74</sup> E.g., Vice Admiral J. B. Colwell, "Nation Needs Military Industrial Link to Survive," *Los Angeles Times*, July 20, 1969, sec. G, p. 3; or Senator Barry Goldwater, who claims that the ultimate aim of the military-industrial complex is "peace in our time, regardless of the aggressive, militaristic image that the left-wing is attempting to give it." *Cong. Rec.*, 91 Cong., 1 sess., 3719–3721.

<sup>75</sup> E.g., William Hyland and Richard Shryock, in *The Fall of Khrushchev* (New York, 1968), 176, write of certain Soviet politicians finding kindred souls among the "military-heavy industry clique"; and I. F. Stone, in "The Test Ban Comedy," *New York Review of Books*, XIV (May 7, 1970), 17, asserts, in regard to the reception of the test ban treaty by America and Russia, that "In both capitals there was a military-industrial complex, buttressed by the same paranoia and cave-man instinct." See also Richard Armstrong, "Military Industrial Complex: Russian Style," *Fortune*, LXXX (Aug. 1, 1969), 84–87, 122–126.

<sup>76</sup> Admittedly, representatives of the New Left have often been willing to lump the Soviet Union and United States together as "two of a kind" (for a very much qualified illustration of this, see, e.g., Herbert Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* [Boston, 1964], 48–55), but astonishingly little of the literature attacking the warfare state has been informed by this perspective. It would seem that, while the nature of the Cold War (involving, so to speak, only one real power on each side) has deprived both liberals and socialists of a certain comparative dimension, the critique of the farther Left has become too radical to inspire comparative analysis of this specific problem.